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No Goldman lipstick on the pig?

On 23rd April Goldman Sachs posted a lengthy  rebuttal  to all charges of impropriety alleged by the SEC and others. The last sub paragraph in their  Executive Summary is relevant in relation to the SEC fraud charge with three key points made: 

1:’Goldman Sachs never created mortgage-related products that were designed to fail.’

2  ‘It is critical to remember that the decline in the value of mortgage-related securities occured as a result of the broader collapse of the housing market.’ and

3:  It (the decline in the value of mortgage-related securities) was not because there were any deficiencies in the underlying instruments. The instruments performed as would have been expected in those unexpected circumstances.’

No pig? The housing market collapsed:

Readers of the Goldwatcher will have read on page 147:

1: ‘You had to be blind not to see the bubble in the US Housing market;’ and

2:’Banks were heavily implicated in the development of the housing market bubble and the crash.’  

Can  banks now seriously claim they were  unaware that their Triple A Rated mortgage backed securities were suspect? Were they blind?   Or innocent bystanders?  Or just naive victims of a wholly unexpected housing market collapse that came out of the blue? Banks were anything but naive and can’t make any of these claims. The securities they created on the back of a bubble they helped inflate were pigs. The only question is who put the lipstick on them.

No Lipstick? The securities performed as expected :

Addressing the key contentious issue in the SEC fraud charge Goldman claim they ’never created mortgage-related products that were designed to fail.’  However there is a more general issue. The relationship between banks and the credit rating agencies they paid to rate their mortgage backed securities. Agencies  who share responsibility for the lipstick on the pig.

Commenting on the absurd Triple A Ratings banks secured for dodgy securities Senator Carl Levin has been scathing. He likens the bank - rating agency relationship to one of the litigants in a case paying the Judge. Or one sporting team paying the referee. The relationship may not have been that corrupt. But neither were banks naive. They can’t protest the housing bust came out of the blue, took them by surprise and their securities performed ‘as expected’ in ‘unexpected circumstances.’ 

A can of worms is open. Integridy of key financial institutions and key underpinnings of our credit based economies are suspect. There are no silver bullets to magic the mess away.

Gold Stateless  Money Franchise:

In a recent comment Weakness Begets Weakness the gold fund and money manager Eric Sprott references ‘the subprime mortgages rated AAA now worth pennies on the dollar.’  He tracks  both the Greek Soveriegn and Mortgage Backed Securities debacles and argues:  ’…as they relate to sovereign debt, the ratings provided by the agencies are highly suspect…there appears to be very little forward-looking information actually factored into their credit models. In some cases, the agency ratings end up looking absurdly optimistic.’

Sprott finds the Triple A rating accorded to the US Government out of touch with reality and, after citing recent analysis by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) he  concludes ‘The ratings agencies can opine all they want, but it seems clear to us that the only true AAA asset to protect your wealth is gold.’ 

On Pages 116 and 117 The Goldwatcher addreses the bottom line as seen by the GAO : ‘Federal Fiscal Policy is unsustainable.’ That was written over two years ago. It was true and menacing then an is even more menacing now.  And it’s why people are seeking the protection afforded by gold’s stateless money franchise now.

Sprott makes a strong case for gold as the enduring Triple A Security that will survive sovereign ratings downgrades.  

# Note added 27th January: 

Yesterday Senator Carl Levin published a confrontational listing of the issues and findings of fact  on which Goldman Executives will be challenged today.  Depending on the legal advice witnesses have they may not all testify.  Levin’s summary reads:

The bipartisan Subcommittee investigation has resulted in the following findings of fact regarding the role of investment banks in the financial crisis:

1. Securitizing High Risk Mortgages.  From 2004 to 2007, in exchange for lucrative fees, Goldman Sachs helped lenders like Long Beach, Fremont, and New Century, securitize high risk, poor quality loans, obtain favorable credit ratings for the resulting residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), and sell the RMBS securities to investors, pushing billions of dollars of risky mortgages into the financial system.
2. Magnifying Risk.  Goldman Sachs magnified the impact of toxic mortgages on financial markets by re-securitizing RMBS securities in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), referencing them in synthetic CDOs, selling the CDO securities to investors, and using credit default swaps and index trading to profit from the failure of the same RMBS and CDO securities it sold.
3. Shorting the Mortgage Market.  As high risk mortgage delinquencies increased, and RMBS and CDO securities began to lose value, Goldman Sachs took a net short position on the mortgage market, remaining net short throughout 2007, and cashed in very large short positions, generating billions of dollars in gain.
4. Conflict Between Client and Proprietary Trading.  In 2007, Goldman Sachs went beyond its role as market maker for clients seeking to buy or sell mortgage related securities, traded billions of dollars in mortgage related assets for the benefit of the firm without disclosing its proprietary positions to clients, and instructed its sales force to sell mortgage related assets, including high risk RMBS and CDO securities that Goldman Sachs wanted to get off its books, creating a conflict between the firm’s proprietary interests and the interests of its clients.
5. Abacus Transaction.  Goldman Sachs structured, underwrote, and sold a synthetic CDO called Abacus 2007-AC1, did not disclose to the Moody’s analyst overseeing the rating of the CDO that a hedge fund client taking a short position in the CDO had helped to select the referenced assets, and also did not disclose that fact to other investors. 
6. Using Naked Credit Default Swaps.  Goldman Sachs used credit default swaps (CDS) on assets it did not own to bet against the mortgage market through single name and index CDS transactions, generating substantial revenues in the process.

Witnesses at Tuesday’s hearing will include Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Financial Officer David Vinier and executives who were involved in the assembly, marketing, sale, and trading of mortgage-related securities.

Opinions and advice:

Readers, particluarly those who have not yet read The Goldwatcher,  are reminded that this blog is not an advisory service. Opinions expressed are not intended as investment advice and should not be treated or used as investment advice